This post continues this series on the Nishmablog that features responses on JVO by one of our two Nishma Scholars who are on this panel. This week's presentation is to one of the questions to which Rabbi Hecht responded.
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Question:
The following question is based on an inquiry to The Ethicist column in the Sunday New York Times Magazine. When there are scientific studies that point to the media having an impact on violent behavior, is it unethical to write, produce or direct violent films and TV shows?
In
that your question regards the Jewish ethical perspective on these
undertakings, what I feel I must first do is briefly digress and discuss
what we may mean by the term Jewish Ethics. It actually has a compound
nature.
A common assumption is the term Jewish Ethics simply refers to Halacha,
i.e. Jewish Law. In fact, Jewish Law is actually only one part of
Jewish Ethics. There are further layers to what we would term Jewish
ethics which emerge from continuing discussions on a subject within a
broader context. Terms such as lifnim meshurat hadin, beyond
the strictures of the law, are sometimes employed to reflect these
realms of Jewish ethical investigation. This term, however, only
reflects one category of such extra-legal conclusions; there are many
more. Jewish Ethics in reality is simply multi-layered on many levels.
The way many understand this layered approach to Jewish Ethics is by perceiving one standard – generally the standard of Halacha
– as a sort of base requirement with the further standards reflecting
higher ones to which a person should aspire. As such, the perception of
many is that Jewish Law, in itself, reflects a lower standard that one
must necessarily abide by while higher levels, beyond the law, reflect
further and further declarations of what is really proper. This
approach, however, is actually somewhat mistaken. While it is true that
we find such examples of distinction in the call of Jewish Ethics --
cases whereby we are told that the average person should abide by one
standard while a more righteous person should abide by another higher
standard (with often a caveat that the average person should actually
not, for various reasons, attempt to abide by this higher standard –
that discussion, though, is not for now) -- the presentation of variant
standards does not necessarily reflect this specific dichotomy in
ethical conclusions. There are different reasons why Jewish Ethics may
yield variant responses to an ethical question.
Halacha,
Jewish Law, actually reflects a micro analysis of a situation, defining
what is right and wrong within the narrow context of the micro action
in itself. Its focus is on the act in itself. Further layers of Jewish
Ethical investigation then often reflect upon the more macro
considerations of the overall situation beyond the micro details of the
act. This could include, for example, the ethical, psychological effect
on the person doing the act. For example, within the technical, micro
definitions of the law prohibiting the causing of pain to animals (tza’ar ba’alei chayim),
if an act has tangible benefit for the human being it is permitted. As
such, hunting when the human will gain benefit from the carcass is
technically permitted under this rule. Rabbi Yechezkel Landau, Noda B’Yehuda, Yoreh Deah 10,
however, still cautions that a Jew should, under normal circumstances,
still refrain from such activities, especially sport hunting. This is
because, beyond the micro parameters of the act, there is also the
psychological effect on the hunter whereby he/she would become less
sensitive to the very value of life. This is an example of a macro
extra-legal Jewish ethical conclusion beyond the micro parameters of the
act itself. Such decisions, however, are much more fluid.
Since
such secondary investigations are also inherently bound to the micro
considerations of the initial, micro, legal analysis, they generally
just expand upon the base halacha to go beyond its strictures.
This generally would lead to stricter standards in consideration of the
macro situation. The macro analysis may, though, also result, in certain
situations, in the introduction of more lenient possibilities, in that
this consideration of the macro situation may, through certain technical
aspects of Jewish Law, have such an effect on the base law.
The Heter Shemitta would be a good example of this. Jews, in Israel, are forbidden to work their land in the seventh year (Shemitta).
There was concern, in the late 1800’s, when Jews first returned to the
land of Israel and began developing it agriculturally, that observance
of Shemitta could possibly have a massive negative effect on
this agricultural endeavour and cause great damage to the religious
settlement movement. In response, some leading rabbis developed a halachic
argument by which it would be possible for the people to work the land
(by legally selling it to non-Jews) and thereby avoid this possible
negative consequence. These rabbis still maintained that, in normal
circumstances, the micro considerations of the law still would demand
that the land not be sold and not be worked. It was only consideration
of the greater macro concerns in this specific situation that led them
to develop a permitted different response given the circumstances. (It
perhaps should also be noted that other leading rabbis disagreed with
their arguments on various different grounds and maintained that the
macro concerns could not lead to this effect – see further, Rabbi Ezra Schwartz, Heter Mechira, YU Torah Online.
These dissenters, though, should not be seen as disagreeing with the
basic theory that there is a macro layer in Jewish Ethics. They simply
did not agree that in this case the macro effect could affect the micro
case.)
Turning
now to our case at hand -- whether, given that media can have an impact
on violent behaviour, it is unethical to write, produce or direct
violent films and TV shows – the prohibition framed by Vayikra 19:14 -- which reads Lifnei iver lo titein michshal,
“Before a blind person do not put a stumbling block” -- is generally
understood to include an injunction against assisting or causing another
to sin. See, further, Sefer HaChinuch, Mitzvah 232. As
such, given that violent behaviour would generally be of a sinful
nature, it would seem that it would be problematic for one to do
something that could lead to such behaviour. The actual definition of
this law in its purest, micro, halachic form maintains, though,
that, to violate the prohibition, the one assisting another to sin must
be an absolutely necessary component in the person’s sinful action. For
example, for someone to be guilty of Lifnei iver, in its base
form, in passing a piece of pork to another Jew who is forbidden to eat
it, it must be that there is no other way for this other person to
acquire this piece of pork. As such, in its most basic form, we can only
say definitely that it would be wrong for one to write, produce or
direct violent films or TV shows if there is no other way for a person
to gain access to such items. That, though, is really only part of the
consideration.
On
the macro level of Jewish Ethics, the problem in assisting others in a
sin actually expands. There is a general standard that one should not be
connected with sin and, as such, even if the other could get the piece
of pork from someone else and, as such, in giving this person the pork
one would not violate Lifnei iver from the micro perspective,
the general Jewish ethical perspective would be that a person should
still not be the one who gives the pork. On this macro level, though,
other considerations, which would also not be considered if we only
specifically looked at the micro act, may also enter and further
complicate the analysis.
The
fact is that, even looking at the micro act, one would consider various
technical issues before arriving at a conclusion of the ethical nature
of an act. For example, in looking at the question even on its most base
level, what do we mean by impact? Does that mean that some people, a
small percentage, are so affected by such media presentations or are the
majority of people so affected? The answer to this question could even
affect the micro halacha. For example, if you are passing the
pork to a group of Jews and non-Jews, that could affect the base law.
The presence of non-Jews in the receiving group could permit the action
of passing. The result may be that it is on the more macro level that we
are more stringent. On this level, we may still say that one should not
pass the pork. On the other hand, though, on this more macro level, we
may also consider the livelihood of the one who is distributing the
pork. Consider a pre-school teacher who has to distribute non-kosher
food to his/her group of students consisting of Jews and non-Jews. We
may find a way for him/her to do so, although it would result in a sin
being performed (the eating of non-kosher by a child is considered to be
a sinful act although the child is not culpable for this behaviour)
since to not do so may result in this person losing his/her job. Similar
broad considerations would also have to be studied in this case of
media.
So
the answer to your question is actually not so simple. In a broad
sense, we can say that since violent behaviour is generally sinful,
there is a problem in undertaking activity that could lead to such
behaviour. (Another factor would be if the subsequent violent behaviour
is not sinful such as in self-defence.) Every specific situation,
though, has its own set of circumstances and to declare, in definite
terms, whether one should write, produce or direct violent films or TV
shows must demand a look at the circumstances.
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