Wednesday 28 July 2010

Thoughts on the Rubashkin Case

Although many have asked me my take on the whole Rubashkin case, I have been reluctant to comment. With all the different reports and presentations on the matter, I can't seem to get a clear indication of the facts. While I expect to hear different versions of what occurred from the different sides, usually in such cases I can still get a feel of what really happened. In this case, I can't seem to even get this feel. There is such a divergence in what is being presented. After reading one article, I am drawn to say this view is totally right. Then, after reading an article that presents an opposing view, I find myself saying that this view is totally right. But they can't, of course, both be totally right. (We aren't talking eilu v'eilu here.) I simply didn't comment because I simply was perplexed. I had no idea of what really happened.

Recently, it occurred to me, though, that my inability to come to an understanding of what really happened actually essentially reflected the real issue in the case. The reason there is such a difficulty in understanding what really happened here is because the opposing sides themselves have differing perceptions of what happened and is happening. The facts themselves are thus seen so differently. And the further reason that this case spiralled into what it became is because the opposing sides could, thus, not even dialogue between themselves.

The essence of the problem is not simply that both sides perceived themselves as being correct but that they also perceived the other side as obviously knowing that it was in the wrong. So what you had was a clash of moral yardsticks with two sides believing, not that they were the correct arbiters of what was moral but, that they were simply applying what everyone must perceive to be the correct and moral view. In this light, the other side can only be described as following an immoral position -- criminals, rishayim. In this light, there is no attempt to understand the other side, try to see a different perspective. At the essence of the case is that both sides believed that they were following the moral high road -- and that the other side must, as such, be following an immoral path.

This conflicting perspective is what, I then saw, made it so difficult to follow what was happening in the case. Perspectives colour the facts. Here the two perspectives were so violently in the opposite. The result is that not only could the two sides not hear the other side but that they also already believed that they knew what the other side was thinking -- and that all that was being said by the other side was just fancy verbal gymnastics.

This does not mean that both sides were right. Just because you believe that your position is the correct one is not a justification for maintaining it. Eidat Korach all thought they were in the right -- to act as they did even as Moshe Rabbeinu warned them not to. The fact is that what one really has to learn is to listen, to hear the other side. Maybe if one person would have said, in this case, that maybe the other side believes that it is following the high road, the outcome would have been different. This might have led to one side then also questioning themselves as to whether their position was the black-and-white correct perspective. Maybe if both sides tried to understand each other from the other perspective, this case would have been solved much earlier and in a much better way.

Rabbi Ben Hecht

4 comments:

The Repenting Jewess said...

See my article of my friendship with the Rubashkins

http://repentingjewess.blogspot.com/2010/07/blog-post.html

david willig said...

Rubashkin was guilty but his sentence is too harsh. He refuses to admit his guilt and wants,like the Rosenbergs to be a cause celebre. Until he admits his guilt he will get no sympathy from me, or from the law.

Garnel Ironheart said...

The issue is one of competing moral systems.
In the Chareidi moral system, cheating and lying is permitted as long as it serves a "higher purpose" like removing money and property from those nasssssty goyim and putting it in the hands of the "right" Jews. Mistreating other human beings is okay as well since the Tanya teaches that they're not really human like the "right" Jews and therefore no sin is committed by oppressing them. After all, isn't their flesh the flesh of donkeys? Finally, any non-Chareidi law system is automatically illegitimate and its conclusions can be maligned and ignored.
Meanwhile, on the American side there is a combination of application of law irregardless of the plaintiff or defendant's origins (halevi that was always true) and a down-home annoyance with people who play "I'm holier than thou" with the other side in court.
The man and all his supporters are a standing Chilul HaShem. I have no hesitation in hoping he rots in prison until his end.

Rabbi Ben Hecht said...

These comments actually demonstrate what I am trying to say in my post. Each side sees themselves as being morally correct and, as such, the other side being as being morally wrong -- and because each side is simply applying their moral yardstick as a given that should be clearly recognized by all, this morally incorrect behaviour has to be seen, even by the perpetrators, as morally incorrect. So the court, as Rabbi Willig points out, throws the book at the Rubashkins because they can't stand this person being defined as righteous when it is so obvious that he isn't. What the court doesn't understand is that in the eyes of the Rubashkin supporters, applying a different moral yardstick, he is in fact righteous -- as shown by the Repenting Jewess' post on her blog. This is not a personal issue but a greater ideological issue and the court, through its actions, is missing this because they can't see the other moral yardstick being applied. Similarly, the court is being vilified by the Rubashkin supporters as anti-Semites because they can't see the other moral yardstick being applied by the court. Garnel alludes to this divide but his conclusion is somewhat tarnished because he also has made this personal and not ideological. They are applying what they were taught. The challenge as such must be to to consider the systems and how to affect them.

Rabbi Ben Hecht